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Abstract— There are currently no complete solutions for digital
rights management. In [1], we describe a possible solution, which
makes use of various web services to fulfil its functions. In this
paper, we discuss some of the security considerations that are
required in our proposed system; many of these considerations
apply to web services in general.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital Rights Management (DRM) aims to provide persistent
access control over digital data. In the past few years, DRM has
been seen as a solution to media piracy and has been widely
implemented for distributing music online. While the concepts
used in DRM can be extended to protect any type of digital data,
there have been very few products that offer such services. While,
Microsoft’s Rights Management Services (RMS) does have many
of the features desired in a general rights management system,
the current system has too many flaws for use as a full blown
security system.
In [1], we proposed an idealised framework for rights manage-
ment that aims to overcome many of the flaws in RMS and other
current DRM systems. Our framework is componentized, with
each component serving one or more roles proposed by Bartolini
et al. [2] and Arnab et al. [3] Our proposed architecture is shown
in Figure 1 and as discussed in [1], each component can serve
as a web service thus allowing for scalability and cross platform
portability.
Fig. 1. Architecture of our proposed DRM framework [3]
ITU-T’s X.800 recommendations define a set of security
services that should be provided by a system to ensure its
security [4]. In this paper we discuss how some of these services
will affect the design of our DRM framework. The services we
discuss are listed below, and while the last service, availability,









In this section, we shall detail some of the design considerations
for each of the security services mentioned in the previous section.
A. Authentication
Authentication is defined in RFC 2828 as the process of
verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity [5]. RFC
2828 separates the process of authentication into two steps –
Identification, where an entity presents an identifier to the secu-
rity system and Verification, where the service can corroborate
the entity and the identifier. In our system, there are two distinct
areas where authentication is crucial.
Firstly, when an end user wants to use a DRM protected
work, the user must be authenticated and the user’s right to
access the work must be established. The DRM Controller or
Virtual Machine (described in more detail in [1]) is the system
entity and resides in the user’s machine. The DRM work has
an associated use license that the DRM controller will use for
corroboration. In our framework, we prescribe the use of X.509
certificates as the user’s identifier. The DRM controller will match
the user’s certificate and the users listed in the use license for
authentication.
The other area where authentication is crucial is between the
services themselves. Although the services can be deployed as
totally anonymous, free and open services that do not require
any form of authentication to use them, they should also cater
for more restricted deployments, like online stores. As mentioned
previously, all entities in our framework make use of digital
1The purpose of a rights management system is to create and enforce
persistent access control of data regardless of the location of the data. The
access control service (and other services) in the list refers to the access
controls for the services in the framework itself.
certificates and we intend extending the use of certificates for all
authentication purposes. The Certificate Authority can be used
in the process of verification.
B. Access Control
RFC 2828 defines access control as protection of system
resources against unauthorized access [5]. As discussed earlier,
access control mechanisms for the services are not mandatory for
implementation, but would still be required for some scenarios.
We propose the use of access control lists together with certificates
for authenticating and determining access control rights for the
services.
C. Data Confidentiality
RFC 2828 defines the data confidentiality service as a service
that protects data against unauthorized disclosure [5]. This ser-
vice is different to privacy which is discussed in section III.
Confidentiality of data must be ensured at all times in the
DRM framework, as any unauthorised access to data will render
the system a failure. There are two distinct areas where data
confidentiality must be ensured - during communication between
services and the storage of data by the services.
Data confidentiality during transmission can be ensured
through the use of secure communication sessions between the
web services. Established protocols such as TLS can be used
for this purpose. Alternatively, the data can be encrypted using
the public key of the recipient and then embedded in SOAP
messages. Because we aim to create each service as a stand alone
web-service, it is desirable to make use of the second approach.
The storage of data during and after processing must also be
considered. For example, a creator would submit their work to
be DRM enabled to the service producer. It would defeat the
purpose of DRM protection, if the work is stored unsecured by
the service producer during and after processing. The use and
enforcement of access control to the service becomes crucial at
this point. Deletion of the original work after production would
help with data security but the securing of data during processing
is a difficult challenge.
D. Data Integrity
The data integrity service protects against unauthorized changes
to data, including both intentional change or destruction and
accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are
detectable [5]. Currently, the data integrity service makes use
digital signatures and we intend to do the same.
E. Non-Repudiation
The non-repudiation service aims to provide protection against
false denial of involvement in a communication [5]. The use of
logs could be used to keep a record of activity, but that would
not necessarily be enough for the purpose of non-repudiation,
as it could be argued that the logs were falsely generated.
In our framework and in the roles described by Bartolini et
al., the controller is a trusted third party that monitors the
DRM transaction. The controller can be used for the purpose
of non-repudiation but it does bring up questions of privacy. An
alternative is for the use of trusted entities as used in Microsoft’s
RMS [6], but that would limit the use of the framework.
F. Availability
RFC 2828 defines availability as a system or a system resource
being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized system
entity, according to performance specifications for the system [5].
With the possibility of global deployment, the availability of some
of the services like the license server and distributor becomes
important. However, there are no easy solutions against a denial
of service attack. The framework must also ensure that the
services are scalable as that could also impact on availability.
We hope our componentized approach will overcome most of
these problems.
III. PRIVACY
Privacy is one of the biggest concerns for current DRM
systems [7] because DRM systems potentially have the ability
to monitor the activities of the end user. For this reason,
privacy concerns must be addressed by our framework. Privacy
concerns are further amplified in our framework because of
the componentized structure. Potentially different systems and
companies may implement the various components and the users
would not like their private information shared between the
various services. For example, the user would be willing to share
his/her bank details with the payment gateway and not with the
license server.
To get round this problem, we are looking at a solution similar
to the dual signatures used in the Secure Electronic Transaction
(SET) protocol [4]. This would allow different services to commu-
nicate without sharing confidential data. The use of an external
control set as discussed in [1] gets round many of the privacy
concerns highlighted by Mulligan et al. like tracking usage of
DRM works [7].
IV. FUTURE WORK
The current focus is to create a complete specification of the
system. This includes the message formats, the communication
protocols and the specifications must take into account the
security considerations discussed in this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented the security considerations that
must be taken into account for the design of a complete DRM
framework. However, many of the solutions to these problems
need to be further investigated and detailed before integration
into the proposed framework. Most of the security considerations
detailed in this paper can be applied to web services in general.
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